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Abstract. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
gives primacy to purpose: Data may be collected and stored only when
(i) end-users have consented, often explicitly, to the purposes for which
that data is collected, and (ii) the collected data is actually necessary
for achieving these purposes. This development in data protection reg-
ulations begets the question: how do we audit a computer system’s ad-
herence to a purpose?
We propose an approach that identifies a purpose with a business process,
and show how formal models of interprocess communication can be used
to audit or even derive privacy policies. Based on this insight, we propose
a methodology for auditing GDPR compliance. Moreover, we show how
given a simple interprocess dataflow model, aspects of GDPR compliance
can be determined algorithmically.
1 Introduction
Data protection is now heavily anchored in national and international law. The
prime example of this is the European General Data Protection Regulation (the
GDPR) [9], which strengthens previous data protection directives to give indi-
viduals more rights on how their personal data is processed. A central principle
of data protection in general, and the GDPR in particular, is that organisations
collecting and processing personal data must be explicit about how the data will
be used and the data is actually used for the purposes for which it was collected.
Contrast this situation with standard access control, which regulates who
may carry out which operations in a system. With few exceptions (e.g., history-
based access control or access decisions incorporating environmental attributes)
access is independent of context: if Alice has the right to access Bob’s bank ac-
count balance, then she can do this for any purpose. This includes both intended
purposes, such as serving as his customer relations manager, or unintended ones,
such as selling information on his financial status to credit agencies. Modern data
protection calls for something more: access control relative to a purpose.
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2The key difficulty then is that mainstream programming technologies do not
leave us any obvious representation of purpose, much less one that can be rea-
sonably related to sites of data collection or data use. There is, however, one area
of computer science where a notion of purpose takes a center stage, and where
formal models abound: The study of Business Process Management, in partic-
ular Business Process Modelling. Here, the operations (both IT and human) of
a business are modelled in one of a variety of formal languages including State-
charts [11], UML [21,22], BPMN [2], GSM [13], CMMN [23], DECLARE [1,25],
or DCR graphs [12,19]. Such a model will include details about both data collec-
tion and data use. Crucially, most definitions of “business process” also either
implicitly or explicitly include the purpose of the process, although sometimes
expressed in terms of a product to be manufactured or a service to be rendered.
We propose exploiting the formal notion of a business process model as a
bridge between a system implementation and the GDPR. In doing so, we exploit
that a business process model by its very nature embodies a particular purpose,
while at the same time it specifies at what points data is collected and used. For
instance, an online-shop will have an order-fulfilment process where a customer’s
address is used to ship a product. Our proposal conflates a formal model of that
process with the purpose of order-fulfilment; the model then describes both data
collection and data use.
This idea poses a challenge to formal business process models. Under the
GDPR, we must account for the data transferred between processes: data col-
lected for one purpose and used for another. For example, a mailing address
might be collected in a customer registration process that is subsequently used
in an order-fulfilment process. Typical process models do not give detailed ac-
counts of such inter-process interactions. We posit that an interprocess dataflow
model is necessary to audit GDPR compliance.
We show that formal models of interprocess communication enable the algo-
rithmic verification of parts of GDPR compliance. However the GDPR in certain
cases goes beyond what we can automatically verify. For example, it can be dif-
ficult to determine whether a text message is an advertisement or a notification
about an upcoming delivery. In these cases, the underlying business processes
themselves must be augmented with human actions, for example explicit man-
ager approval of the text message. Our approach therefore supports automated
compliance checking complimented by human actions when necessary.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We show how a mechanism for relating purpose to implementation artefacts
is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR (Section 4.1).
2. We put forward the idea of identifying a business process and a purpose
(Section 4.2).
3. We identify inter-process communication as key to GDPR compliance (Sec-
tion 4.3).
4. We propose a methodology for auditing GDPR compliance by decomposing
the audit into verifying the compliance of an implementation to a process
3model, of a process model to a privacy policy, and of these latter two to the
GDPR itself (Section 4.4).
5. We show how a formal process model allows us to verify compliance of certain
aspects of the GDPR algorithmically (Definitions 5.1 and 5.4). In particular,
we can generate compliant privacy policies.
6. Finally, we illustrate through examples that GDPR compliance cannot be
fully achieved by algorithmic means, and that process models can fill the
gap here by specifying needed human actions (Section 5.4).
2 The General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR [9] was passed on April 14, 2016 and will come into force May 25,
2018. It embodies a major departure from current practices. It requires not only
that data is only collected after obtaining consent from the user, but also that
data is collected and used only for specific purposes, and must be deleted when
those purpose are no longer applicable. The GDPR spells out these requirements
in its notions of purpose limitation and data minimisation, its treatment of con-
sent, and the right to be forgotten.
Purpose limitation [9, Article 5, §1(b)]:
“[Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with
those purposes; [...]”
Data minimisation [9, Article 5, §1(c)]:
“[Personal data shall be] adequate, relevant and limited to what is neces-
sary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed [...] ”
Consent (and its connection to purpose) [9, Recital (32), emphasis ours]:
“Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her [...]
Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for
the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has mul-
tiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them.”
Right to be forgotten [9, Article 17, §1]:
“[...] the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data with-
out undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes
for which they were collected or otherwise processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent [...]”
4We remark that the GDPR mandates access control [9, Article 25, §1]:
“The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are nec-
essary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. [...] per-
sonal data are not made accessible without the individual’s intervention
to an indefinite number of natural persons.”
Finally, the GDPR has teeth. It imposes two levels of fines, depending on
which parts of the GDPR are violated. The highest level imposes fines of up to
20 million EUR or 4% of the organisation’s world-wide turnover, whichever is
higher [9, Article 83, §5]. Processing without consent is on the list of high-level
infringements [9, Article 83 §5(a)].
For the purposes of the present paper, we shall emphasize the above concepts
of purpose limitation, data minimisation, consent, and the right to be forgotten.
However, the GDPR confers on citizens (data subjects) a remarkable range of
additional rights, such as rights of “access” and “data portability” [9, Article 15
& 20] and the right to be notified of data breaches [9, Article 33].
In summary, for data collection to be GDPR compliant, the data must:
1. be collected for a purpose,
2. to which the user has consented, and
3. be necessary to achieve that purpose;
4. moreover the collected data must be deleted when it is no longer necessary
for any purpose.
Contrast to extant privacy policies. Privacy policies are statements about how an
organization collects, processes, and more generally manages, the personal data
of its customers or other individuals. An informal survey of existing policies
(including Facebook [8], Google [10], and IBM [14]) shows that their essence
effectively consists of two types of declarations:
– The kinds of data collected, e.g., credentials, cookies, purchases, etc.
– How collected data is used, e.g., to process orders, personalize offerings
and advertisements, etc.
These statements may be augmented with additional information, such as how
non-personally identifiable information may be used, which usages one may opt
out of, security measures taken when storing and processing data, and the like.
From the above, we conclude that current best-practice is to formulate coarse
grained privacy policies. Their essence amounts to two sets, a set DC of the kinds
of data collected and a set DU of data usages. In some cases (e.g., Google), a
relation (a subset of DC×DU) is given, where it is indicated how particular data
items are used, e.g., “we use information collected from cookies to improve your
user experience.” However, in most cases (e.g., Facebook, IBM) the description
of DC is non-specific with respect to which data is involved in which usages,
e.g., “The information you provide may be used for marketing purposes.”
5The GDPR requires more. For example, Recital 39 specifies that the pur-
poses that data will be used must be transparently laid out in a privacy policy.
In particular, it should be clear that the personal data should be “adequate,
relevant, and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are
processed.” Indeed, “personal data should be processed only if the purpose of
the processing could not reasonably be fulfilled by other means.” This requires
fine grained privacy policies that clearly elucidate purposes and the associated
data required. Our thesis is that business process models provide the right basis
for this elucidation, both supporting the creation of fine-grained natural lan-
guage privacy policies (e.g., informing data owners) and supporting audit and
compliance (e.g., informing technical specialists).
3 Running example
We provide an example from on-line retailing that we subsequently use to illus-
trate our methodology to audit compliance with the GDPR. An on-line retailer
has customers who order goods using the retailer’s homepage, pay with their
credit cards, and expect to subsequently receive their orders by post. The re-
tailer may engage in marketing, targeted or otherwise, using channels such as
web-advertisements and e-mail.
We will focus just on the core processes of such a retailer, emphasizing what
data is collected and used. These core processes are:
Register Customer: A prospective customer signs up with an on-line retailer. As
part of this process, the customer provides his e-mail, his mailing addresses,
and his credit card information.
Purchase: A registered customer selects a product on the retailer’s homepage,
pays using the recorded credit card number, and the retailer subsequently
sends the product and invoice.
Mass Marketing: A customer’s e-mail or physical address is used to send oth-
erwise un-targeted advertisement.
Targeted Marketing: A customer’s e-mail or physical address and past purchase
history is used to send individually targeted advertisements.
In the following, we write processes in sans-serif, e.g., Mass Marketing, and de-
scriptions of data classes in brackets, e.g., 〈credit card number〉.
In Figure 1 we show example models of these processes, written in the
BPMN [2] notation. In brief, the diagram comprises four pools, one for each
process; inside each pool is a number of activities in boxes, some human, some
automated. Activities with white envelopes take incoming messages, typically
user input; black envelopes produce outgoing messages, typically output to the
user. Activities marked with a person icon are undertaken by humans. The se-
quencing of activities is indicated with solid arrows between them. Activities
may both produce and consume data stored in databases, indicated by dashed
arrows. Note that the databases allow data to be shared between processes.
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Fig. 1. BPMN model of the core on-line retailer processes.
4 Purposes
The GDPR’s emphasis on purpose has interesting and subtle ramifications for
both the design and audit of computer systems. In this section, we develop the
idea that business process models encode purposes, and that this encoding can
be used to analyse compliance with the GDPR.
4.1 Purpose and compliance
As with any regulation that applies to computer systems, we are faced with two
key questions:
– How do we build a computer system in a manner guaranteeing compliance?
– How do we analyse or audit a computer system for compliance?
7Reviewing the conditions (1)–(4) from Section 2, which are required for a
data-collection to be compliant with the GDPR, we see an immediate problem:
The notion of compliance revolves around the notion of purpose, but purpose
tends not to have an explicit representation in contemporary computer system
implementations. Whereas notions like “user authentication” or “order man-
agement” usually have an explicit representation as lines of code and tables in
databases, we seldom see implementation artefacts representing “the purpose”
of a particular dataset. But to answer the two questions above, we must not only
be able to identify the points at which data is collected (which is presumably
easy), we must also associate that data with a purpose.
For example, suppose our on-line retailer collects a user’s e-mail address dur-
ing registration. There are legitimate uses for such information: it may be used
as a user-id, to send invoices, or for password resets; alternatively, it might also
be used for illegitimate purposes such as unsolicited marketing. By examining
the system’s code, we will readily discover where data may be collected and pro-
cessed. However, it is impossible to determine from the code alone whether data
being collected at a particular point is personal data or not, for what purpose
data is being processed, and if it is really necessary for that purpose.
Even if we can technically determine every place in the implementation that
accesses this e-mail address, we still may not be able to determine the purpose
for that access. For example, the Mass Marketing process of our e-shop could
enable staff to send arbitrary messages to every registered customer. Obviously,
we cannot statically determine what the purpose of these messages might be: A
staff member might send important information about deliveries (“Due to strikes
at our logistics partner, all deliveries will be delayed.”); marketing messages
(“You have ordered recently from us. How about also buying an electric cat
food dispenser?”); or even political propaganda (“Vote for me for president!”).
Finally, we must delete data when it has served its purposes. But it is difficult
to know when this is the case, especially in large computer systems where the
same data may be used in multiple subsystems, for multiple purposes.
4.2 Business processes as purposes
We propose using the business processes [5] that the computer system in question
supports to identify purposes and to classify the types of data collected. The key
insight is that business processes explicitly represent one or more purposes. Here
is a standard definition of a business process [5, pp. 5–7] (emphasis ours):
“a structured, measured set of activities designed to produce a specific
output for a particular customer or market. It implies a strong emphasis
on how work is done within an organization, in contrast to a product
focus’s emphasis on what. A process is thus a specific ordering of work
activities across time and space, with a beginning and an end, and clearly
defined inputs and outputs: a structure for action. [...] Processes are
the structure by which an organization does what is necessary
to produce value for its customers [...]”
8The emphasized sentence highlights that a business process comprises both
a purpose—the specifics of “to produce value for its customers”—as well as
concrete steps—the specifics of “the structure by which.” In practice, the purpose
of a process will be most clearly represented by its title or perhaps a brief natural
language statement. Through the description of “how work is done,” a process
description also gives us the necessary information about what data is collected,
and where it is used. Moreover, when purposes are processes, we can determine
when a purpose is served, e.g., when the corresponding process has terminated.
In general, it is reasonable to associate a “process” with a “purpose”, e.g., the
purchase process/purpose, the mass marketing process/purpose, the customer
satisfaction evaluation process/purpose, or the warranty process/purpose.
4.3 Inter-process communication
In practice, a company may collect data about customers in one process and use
that data in another. In our example, the Customer registration process collects
〈credit card number〉 and customer information (name, email, and physical ad-
dress) that we simply refer to as 〈customer〉, but it does not itself use these. They
are instead used by the Purchase, Targeted marketing, and Mass marketing pro-
cesses. This disconnect mirrors a challenge faced by many companies: whereas
the individual processes within the company are usually well-understood by the
staff undertaking them, including the interfaces to other processes, the global
picture of all processes in the company is rarely well-understood. But the GDPR
requires such a global understanding: data collected in one process may migrate
to other processes, and end-user consent is required for all involved processes.3
We propose that for contemporary process models to be truly useful for
GDPR analysis, we must interpret collections of processes as data-flow graphs.
We therefore introduce the following simple model of process collections.
Definition 4.1 (process collection). A process collection PC is a tuple PC =
(P,D,DU,DC) comprising:
1. a set P of processes,
2. a set of data classes D,
3. a relation DC ⊆ D×P specifying what data is collected by which processes,
and
4. a relation DU ⊆ D × P specifying what data is used by which processes.
Note that the set D of data classes is not a set of data values per se, but rather
a set of the possible kinds of data, e.g., addresses, credit card numbers, etc.
Example 4.2. We construct a process collection modelling the example from Sec-
tion 3 by lifting the informal description of the example to the process collec-
tion QC given formally in Figure 2 and represented visually in Figure 3. In the
3 Notice that without the anchor of processes-as-purposes, this problem is hardly
solvable in practice. For example, what are the purposes the user consents to for the
hundreds of computer systems running at a large corporation?
9P = {Purchase,Register Customer,Targeted Marketing,Mass Marketing}
D = {〈customer〉, 〈credit card number〉, 〈order〉, 〈profile〉}
DU = [Purchase 7→ {〈customer〉, 〈credit card number〉};
Register Customer 7→ ∅;
Targeted Marketing 7→ {〈customer〉, 〈order〉, 〈profile〉};
Mass Marketing 7→ {〈customer〉}]
DC = [Purchase 7→ {〈order〉};
Register Customer 7→ {〈customer〉, 〈credit card number〉};
Targeted Marketing 7→ {〈profile〉};
Mass Marketing 7→ ∅]
Fig. 2. The use of personal data in an online retailer: process collection QC =
(P,D,DU,DC) corresponding to the example of Section 3. To conserve space, the
relations DU and DC have been represented as maps.
Purchase
orderRegister customer
customer
credit card number
Mass Marketing
Targeted Marketing profile
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the process collection QC of Figure 2.
latter figure, the processes of the retailer are rendered as square boxes labelled
Purchase, Register Customer, Targeted Marketing, and Mass Marketing. Data is
written as dashed, dog-eared boxes, e.g., 〈customer〉, 〈credit card number〉, and
〈order〉. Data use and collection is indicated by arrows between process boxes
and data boxes:
1. An arrow from a process to data indicates that the process collects and stores
the given data, e.g., the Register Customer process records the new customer’s
contact information (name and address) in the data class 〈customer〉.
2. An arrow from data to a process indicates that the process uses the given
data, e.g., the Purchase process uses the customer’s contact information in
〈customer〉 and the payment information in 〈credit card number〉.
For example, the Targeted Marketing process uses the order data 〈order〉 and
produces the personal 〈profile〉 of the customer. The Mass Marketing process
similarly uses the customer data, but it does not use the orders.
In this example, we derived the process collection from the informal descrip-
tion of the on-line retailer. In general, process collections can be extracted (even
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automatically) from formal process models such as the BPMN diagrams of Fig-
ure 1.
Example 4.3. Consider the BPMN models in Figure 1. The set P of processes is
the set of labels of lanes. The set of data classes D is the set of labels of database
access lines. The relations DC and DU are given by dashed lines from processes
to databases (DC) and databases to processes (DU).
We can use the data production and usage relations to derive which user
consents are needed. For example, the on-line retailer must acquire consent to
use the customer data for future purchases and mass marketing. If we know
when processes can no longer be started, we can also use the relations to infer
when data must be deleted or made non-personal, for example by anonymising
it. We shall pursue this idea further in Section 5.3.
4.4 A methodology for auditing for the GDPR
We now propose a methodology for auditing for the GDPR. Our methodology
has the following inputs. First, at the lowest level, we require an implementation,
say, written in Java, of the system under consideration. Second, we require a
collection of process models describing the system’s behaviour, from which we
can produce a formal process collection (Definition 4.1). Finally, we require a
user-facing privacy policy. Recall from Section 2 (transparency, consent) that
this is required by the GDPR.
To establish GDPR compliance, we must show the following:
1. The implementation conforms to the process collection. That is, the imple-
mentation implements the processes described in the process collection.
2. The process collection conforms to the privacy policy. That is, the processes
described actually treat data in the manner described by the privacy policy.
3. The process collection conforms to the GDPR. That is, the processes de-
scribed follow the GDPR, for example they delete data as appropriate.
4. The privacy policy conforms to the GDPR. That is, the privacy policy does
not make statements outside the GDPR, such as “we collect your personal
information and use it for undisclosed purposes.”
We illustrate the required conformance relations in Figure 4.
Following this methodology ensures that the purpose limitation is upheld be-
cause the implementation collects and uses data as specified by the process col-
lection (1); the process collection uses data as specified in the privacy policy (2);
and both the privacy policy and process collection conform to the GDPR (3,4).
The difficulty of these steps depend on the exact nature of the implementa-
tion. For example, for Step (1), if the implementation has a collection of BPMN
models as its specification, the compliance of that collection to an implementa-
tion might be reasonably assumed or spot-checked by an auditor. If the imple-
mentation is based on a BPMN process engine or a Statechart interpreter [11],
the process might be automated. Alternatively, a process collection might be
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  (4)Process model collection
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(2)Implementation(s)
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Fig. 4. Conformance requirements. An arrow A −− B means “A conforms to B”.
obtained from an informal requirements specification (indicating processes) and
a dataflow analysis [16] of a mainstream programming-language implementation
(establishing collection and use).
In the latter case, where an informal requirements specification is the start-
ing point, Step (1) involves establishing that a process collection is a dataflow
model of a program. This problem is in general undecidable, so this step en-
tails approximating dataflow. But what kind of approximation do we need? An
under-approximation would leave DU smaller than it really is: Some pair (d, p)
is not in DU even though the system uses data d for the purpose p, in violation
of GDPR consent requirements. Conversely, an over-approximation would leave
DU larger than it really is: Some pair (d, p) is in DU even though the system
does not use data d for the purpose p, in violation of the purpose limitation.
These observations point to a curious problem at the intersection between
computer science and law: if static analysis cannot determine whether data will
or will not be used, is there a violation of the purpose limitation? Here, we take
the pragmatic solution that the inclusion of a data usage in a process collection
means the possible use of that data, and leave for the human audit to verify that
this usage may indeed happen in the implemented process.
Finally, we note that if we omitted the process-model middleman, some other
means would be required to relate purposes to implementation artefacts.
5 Algorithmic verification of compliance
We demonstrate in this section how parts of our methodology for demonstrating
GDPR compliance can be supported or even achieved algorithmically.
5.1 Consent statements
We saw in Section 2 that the GDPR requires consent to the collection of data for
specific purposes. We also saw how current privacy policies do not support this,
primarily by failing to distinguish between different kinds of data and the pur-
poses they are used for. For example, because Mass Marketing uses 〈customer〉,
a privacy policy compliant with the GDPR must include words to the effect “we
use your customer contact information (name and address) for mass marketing,”
indicating for what purpose the customers’ contact information is used.
We now show how conformance of a process collection to a privacy policy
(Part 2 of Figure 4) can be decided algorithmically. Recall that the DU com-
ponent of a process collection PC comprises a set of pairs (d, p), where d is a
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class of data and p is a process using that data. Assuming that PC adequately
models the underlying processes, that is, DU comprises exactly the data used by
the processes, we can automatically generate the corresponding privacy policy.
Definition 5.1 (Data purpose). Let PC = (P,D,DU,DC) be a process col-
lection. A data purpose DP is a relation DP ⊆ D×P . For a data purpose DP ,
the privacy policy pp(DP ) is the set of statements
“We use d for p,”
for each (d, p) ∈ DP .
That is, a data purpose associates data with processes. Note that the above
definition may associate the same data with multiple uses, e.g., users would
typically be presented with a consent statement like “we collect d1, d2 for purpose
p1 and we collect d1, d3, d4 for purpose p2.”
d p
〈customer〉 Purchase
〈credit card number〉 Purchase
〈customer〉 Mass Marketing
〈profile〉 Targeted Marketing
〈order〉 Targeted Marketing
〈customer〉 Targeted Marketing
Fig. 5. Privacy policy pp(DU) for the process collection QC = (P,D,DU,DC) of
Figure 2.
Example 5.2. Let QC = (P,D,DU,DC) be the process model of Figure 2. Then
DU comprises the pairs in Figure 5. Using Definition 5.1, and allowing meaning-
preserving natural language transformations, the Targeted Marketing privacy pol-
icy reads: “We collect your customer information (name, address), order history,
and profile, and use them to send you targeted advertising.”
The notion of data purpose (Definition 5.1) naturally orders the possible data
purposes by set inclusion.
Lemma 5.3. Let D be a universe of data and P a collection of processes. Then
the possible data purposes form a lattice under the subset-relation, i.e., DP v
DP ′ iff DP ⊆ DP ′.
Proof. Immediate from Definition 5.1
The lattice ordering provides a means of formalising privacy policies where
users give consent to some, but not all, purposes supported by the system. For
13
a process collection PC = (P,D,DU,DC), DU is the maximal data purpose;
asking anything more is in effect asking users for permission to data that the
underlying processes do not actually use, violating purpose limitation.
Returning to the present setting where users must consent to all purposes, we
note that DU is in fact also the least admissible data purpose: If users consent to
strictly less than DU , there must be a pair (d, p) ∈ DU the user did not consent
to. Hence the system violates the GDPR requirements on obtaining consent.
Besides the outright generation of privacy policies, we can also use this ob-
servation to check an existing privacy policy for correctness: Simply extract from
the policy the appropriate set of pairs {(d1, p1), (d2, p2), (d3, p2)} and compare
it with DU .
5.2 Data minimisation
In the last section, we generated data purpose statements algorithmically from
process models. However, these statements are GDPR compliant only if they
mention all the data used by the process. As we saw in Section 2, the GDPR
also requires that all of the data collected is necessary for the stated purpose.
We caution that necessity is a slippery concept. For example, one may ask
whether an online merchant really needs my credit card number given that send-
ing an invoice might satisfy the same purpose of collecting payment. We shall
leave such fine distinctions for the auditors.
We can however determine algorithmically some classes of unnecessary data:
we can check whether data that has been collected is in fact also used. If not,
that data is clearly unnecessary, violating data minimisation. This information
will help a human auditor quickly judge the conformance arrow (3) in Figure 4.
Definition 5.4 (Used data). Let PC = (P,D,DU,DC) be a process collection
and let d ∈ D be data for PC. We say that d is used iff for some p ∈ P we
have (d, p) ∈ DU .
In other words, d is “used” if some process uses it according DU .
Example 5.5. Returning to the process collection QC of Figures 2 and 3, it is
straightforward to verify that no collected data is unused. However, if we did
not have the Targeted Marketing process, then 〈profile〉 would not be present at
all and 〈order〉 would not be “used” in the sense of Definition 5.4. Consequently,
either the order data could not be legally stored in an order data base or the
process collection is incomplete.
We remark that the data used is computable in time polynomial in the size
of L(PC) under reasonable assumptions about representation:
Proposition 5.6. Let PC = (P,D,DU,DC) be a process such that P and DU
are finite, and assume that P and DU are represented as sequences of their ele-
ments. Then computing whether any d of D is used is possible in time polynomial
in the sizes of P and DU .
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Proof. Let d ∈ D be given. Observe that d is used iff for some (d′, p) ∈ DU
we have d′ = d. Given a pair (d′, p), we can determine in time O(|d|) whether
d′ = d. We can then compute whether d is used by iterating over the elements
of DU in time O(|d| ∗ |DU |).
5.3 Deletion
We saw in Section 2 that the GDPR, via the right to be forgotten, requires that
data must be deleted on request, provided that the purposes for which consent
has been given no longer apply. Since we have identified purposes and processes,
this would be when either (i) no currently running process uses the data, and
(ii) no process that may be started in the future uses the data.
For practical purposes, determining the set of (non-)applicable processes is
often straightforward. In many web-services, the set of applicable processes is
all or nothing: all the services are offered until the user deletes his account, at
which point no services are offered.
Example 5.7. In our running example of an on-line retailer, we assume that
consent is given before the customer inputs personal data, i.e. in the first activity
in the Register customer process given in Figure 1. After a customer is registered,
purchases and marketing may be started indefinitely. Implicit in our process
collection model is that once the user deletes his account then no more processes
can be started (equivalently, no more purposes can be activated) and the user’s
data must now be deleted.
5.4 Human verification of compliance
We have seen in the preceding subsections that some aspects of GDPR compli-
ance can be verified algorithmically. However, in Section 4.1 we explained that
other aspects cannot: We cannot distinguish algorithmically between, e.g., mar-
keting messages and political propaganda. To enforce the purpose limitation in
such cases it may be necessary to add human enforcement activities.
We saw an example already in the BPMN processes given in Figure 1: the
Mass Marketing process includes a human activity “Approve advertisement text”,
whereby an authorised staff member confirms that the proposed advertisement
text is in fact an advertisement.
This ability to model both automated and human activities is unique to busi-
ness process models. This makes them particularly well-suited for the analysis
of GDPR compliance: A model of only the computer systems cannot account for
the necessary human activities.
6 Related work
Purpose-based access control [3,4] proposes an access control mechanism for
databases where each data item has an associated intended purpose. To ac-
cess the item, a user must state his access purpose. Both kinds of purposes are
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arranged in hierarchies, and a notion of compatibility of purpose is defined. The
access control mechanism itself is essentially role-based access control (RBAC).
Similar ideas form the basis of a formal language for specifying purpose-based
access control policies in [30] and for deriving formal invariants and proof obliga-
tions from a formal specification of such policies. The idea of matching a stated
with an intended purpose is also pursued in [24]. Finally, similar to our work, [26]
proposes identifying purposes and business processes. The authors use knowl-
edge of the current task within a process for access control decisions. In contrast
to all of these works, our focus is not on designing access control mechanisms,
but rather audit and compliance.
Privacy-aware role based access control [20] proposes extending RBAC with
a hierarchical notion of purpose to model privacy policies, emphasizing conflict
detection in the resulting formal models. Similarly, Purpose-Aware Role-Based
Access Control [18] extends RBAC with an explicit notion of purpose, in part
to alleviate technical difficulties in expressing privacy policies in RBAC. In [7],
the authors propose an access control mechanism supporting conditional pur-
pose, allowed purpose, and prohibited purpose, each of which is defined through
dynamic roles, with the actual intended purpose computed dynamically. The pa-
per emphasizes balancing privacy concerns against data mining opportunities.
In [17], the authors use information-flow labels to specify and enforce purpose-
based access control policies. They argue that information-flow diagrams are
well-suited to express and reason about purpose-based privacy policies. This is
very much akin to the use of process collections in the present paper.
All the above works associate data with purpose, an idea we have taken up
in our notion of process collections. However, the previous works proceed to give
methods for access control under various circumstances. In contrast, our work
is concerned with the questions: what are the appropriate purposes in the first
place, and is (data) access required for these purposes? Moreover, these other
methods are invariably automated, whereas we have emphasized that the GDPR
also requires human activities to ensure compliance (see Section 5.4).
Finally, [15] gives a semantic model of purposes themselves, stipulating that
“the purpose of an action is determined by its situation among other inter-
related actions.” The authors model actions and their relations in an action
graph, and develop a modal logic and model-checking algorithm for verifying
purpose-based policies. This work is akin to the present one in that it addresses
the question “how do we find purposes?” However, the present paper does not
attempt a semantic analysis of purpose, and leverages instead the observation
that practitioners have already defined purposes via business process modelling.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
We investigated the GDPR and we showed how a mechanism for relating purpose
to implementation artefacts is necessary to demonstrate compliance. To remedy
the problem that purpose is usually not represented explicitly in implementations
of computer systems, we put forward the idea of identifying a business process
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Fig. 6. Lifecycle model for the on-line retailer processes.
and a purpose. We proposed a methodology where GDPR compliance is de-
composed into the compliance of an implementation to an interprocess dataflow
model, of the dataflow model to a privacy policy, and of these latter two models
to the GDPR. We demonstrated that given a model of interprocess dataflow, we
may verify compliance of certain aspects of the GDPR algorithmically. In partic-
ular, we can generate privacy policies automatically from the model and detect
violations of data minimisation. Finally, we explained why GDPR compliance
cannot be entirely automated and the role of humans in enforcement.
Discussion. We return now to the question of data deletion. Recall from Sec-
tion 5.3 that data should be deleted once the purposes for which it is used can no
longer apply, that is, when the corresponding processes can no longer be started.
Providing such a fine-grained account of deletion requires modelling when pro-
cesses start using a process lifecycle model. We provide an illustrative example
here, leaving the full development of this idea to future work.
Our example is the model in Figure 6, which models the lifecycle of the
processes in our running example. We have added processes here for deleting
an account and revoking consent. This model is a finite state machine where
states distinguish what processes can be started and transitions are processes
started. Some processes, such as Purchase, do not change the current state. Other
processes lead to state changes, such as the new processes Revoke consent and
Delete account. In a given state, the set of processes that may yet start is the set
of reachable transitions. For example, in state 0, it is all the processes; in state 1
it is all but Register customer; in state 2 it is only Purchase and Delete account;
and in state 3, we may not start any processes. From this information, we can
compute what data we must delete. For example, in the transition from state 1
to 2 we lose the ability to start Targeted marketing, which is the only purpose
for storing the 〈profile〉 data. It follows that immediately after this transition,
we must delete that data.
Future work. Another important area for future work concerns data transfers
to third parties. The GDPR has precise rules about who may transfer data to
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other parties, when these transfers can occur, and under what circumstances
other parties can or must delete, produce, or store data. Naturally, this opens
up questions about audits and compliance similar to the ones addressed in this
paper. Moreover, enforcement in this setting is closely related to research on
distributed usage control [27,28] and on executable process models [6,29]. Other
relevant future work includes how to distinguish between personally identifiable
information and other information, and handling systems that allow users to
consent to some, but not all, purposes.
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